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The logic of the world is
the logic of the descriptions (of the world)
Heinz van Foerster
Introduction
Ever since the Cretan philosopher Epimenides put forth the proposition that
"All Cretans are liars," paradoxes have challenged orthodox thinking.

Paradoxes

have not only managed to paralyze human interaction (as with the command: "Disobey
my orders") but also stunned numerous logicians and mathematic ians.

Whitehead and

Russell discovered that paradox is central to all logical inquiry and devoted the
introductory chapter of their Principia Mathematica (1910) to the logical problems
arising from certain contradictions and to a way of avoiding them.
their proposal is the theory of logical types.

The essence of

Since Bateson il .al_.'s (1956, 1972,

1978) recognition of Whitehead and Russell's theory of logical types, the notion of
paradox has gained increasing importance in theories of human communication. 1

In Bateson and his followers' works, paradoxes are seen as contributing to mental
disorders and to problematic forms of interaction, thus establishing the

pathogenetic aspects of paradox.2

My thesis is that paradox also has important morphogenetic dimensions and

might be a stimulus,3 if not jJl§ .§J;imulus, for human cognitive growth and for
social-organizational development including the destruction of the orthoaox.

I claim that Whitehead and Russell's theory of logical types has become a
pillar of the orthodox view of man and of society, ruling out the emergence of
paradoxes rather than solving them.
have followed their footsteps.

Many conceptual schemes in the social sciences

They have reified and ref ined this orthodox view,
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leaving little space for understanding human behavior.

I believe that recent

developments in logic and in cybernetics have paved some inroads into the world of
the orthodox.

I will review and exemplify some of the resolutions to paradoxes

emerging in human situations in the hope of making the paradoxical nature of
communication somewhat more accessible to theoretical developments.

Paradox
The first concept in the title of this paper is paradox.

Epistemologically,

the word comes from the Greek para + dokein and means "to think more."

It shares

its prefix with many familiar words like "parallel, n "paranoia, n "paranormal,"
"paralysis," all of which suggest a unity of two apparent opposites, like the two
sides of a coin.
currency).

(Perhaps not coincidentally, "para" still names the Turkish

A paradox could be characterized as a phenomenon that requires an

observer to reconcile two apparently conflicting views, "to think twice."
Following the classical tradition, Webster's dictionary stresses the logical
nature of paradox when characterizing it as "an argument that apparently derives
self-contradictory conclusions by valid deductions from acceptable premises"
(1967: 610).

Quine points out that some paradoxes are resolvable by showing that a

premise was slightly false, that the inferences included unjustifiable steps, or
that the conclusions turned out to be more plausible than initially thought
(1981: 178).

However, the paradoxes of interest here cannot be reduced to mere

"human errors" of deduction.
Citing a 1906 article by H. Poincare', Whitehead and Russell suggest that
paradoxes possess what Poincare' called a "vicious cycle: n "Take, for example, the
law of excluded middle in the form of 'all propositions are true or false.' If from
this law we argue that because the law of excluded middle is a proposition,
therefore the law of excluded middle is true or false, we incur a vicious cycle
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fallacy" (1910: 40).
self-reference.
proposition�

The underlying structure of these vicious cycles is

The law of excluded middle is a proposition and refers to a

Its truth is embedded in this circular form.

Not all self-referential propositions are vicious in this sense.

Some create

no problems at all, like:
This is a sentence.
I wrote this sentence.
Have I asked a question?
And some are demonstrably false, in the sense that their very existence invalidates
their claim, like:
This sentence has six words.
You wrote this sentence.
Can't I ask a question?
I am sorry, I never apologize.

A vicious cycle emerges, for example, in the above mentioned liar paradox in which
Epimenides is telling the truth just when he is lying and he is lying just when he
is telling the truth.

Similar examples are found in the dialogue:

Socrates:
Plato:

"What Plato is about to say is false"
"Socrates has just spoken truly"

which condenses to the well known example:
This sentence is false
and will be recognized in the sign:

_________L________
Please ignore
this notice

Other still rather simple vicious cycle paradoxes may be seen in the following
examples;
Be spontaneousl
All rules have exceptions.
Tell me you love me-••• I love you
-you're just saying that.
Vicious cycle type paradoxes, or antinomies as Quine (1981: 178) calls them,
may be characterized by the logical formula:
P implies P
where P is a proposition (e.g. "Epimenides the Cretan is telling the truth"), Pis
the complement of P (e.g. "Epimenides the Cretan is lying") and the implication is
both ways.

One must also emphasize that implications take time to compute.

In the

example "be sponaneous", the speech act preceeds the recognition of its content,
invalidating either the legitimacy of being ordered to do something or the nature
of that order's content.
non-vicious paradoxes or

The receiver cannot accept both simultaneously.

contradictions

may be characterized by the logical

formula:
P and P.

The
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Both paradoxes clearly distinguish between what is (true) and what is not (true),
but exclude the possibility of settling on either side of the distinction.

Unlike

contradicti�ns which simply exclude all interpretations, antinomies allow one to
select one interpretation; but as soon as one has made this choice one is forced to
abandon it in favor of its complement and as soon as one has examined the latter
one finds himself to be back to the former, ad infinitum -- hence the viciousness
of the cycle.
I might add that many of Bateson•s paradoxes, for example the two channel
communications:
verbal: "I love you 11
non-verbal: I despise you
appear to be contradictions not antinomies but they may become paradoxes in the
context of a situation in which the receiver of contradictory messages is forced to
make a choice which entails taking one channel to be of a different logical type.
(Cronen, et .al.

1982).

(logical) discourse.
well.

Moreover, paradoxes are not limited to traditional formal

They may become manifest in other forms of description as

For example, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle is concerned with the

comparison of two measurements of the same phenomenon.

Recognizing the obtrusive

nature of the measuring operation, the principle states that the more precise of
the two measures will have distorted the phenomenon of interest more so than the
less precise measure.
precision.

The researcher is forced to choose between validity and

He cannot have both.

Information
The second concept in the title of this paper is information.

By this I do
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not mean a statement of fact (as opposed to entertainment or pleasure), knowledge
about the world or the content a message conveys.

Although facts, knowledge and

message con�ent involve information in some way, I find it useful to regard
information MA change in .an observer's state o.f. uncertainty caused by some event
in his world.

This conception of information is not new, although its process

nature is rarely realized.

By way of explanation, let me compare information with

the more accepted concept of energy: I would suggest that information is related to
uncertainty as energy is related to matter.
First, neither energy nor information exists in a vacuum.
in material processes to which one must refer.

Both are embodied

Just as one can speak of energy

only in conjunction with some specific resource, fuel or storage capacity, and must
express this quantity relative to the surrounding entropic conditions, so one can
speak of information only in conjunction with a physically identifiable source, a
message or a situation as described by an observer and relative to what he already
knows.
Second, energy and information are measures of work.

But, whereas energy is a

measure of the physical work required to transform matter of one form into matter
of another form, information is a measure of the (intellectual) work required to
distinguish to a degree better than chance among a set of uncertain possibilities.
For an uninformed observer, distinctions, decisions and choices are arbitrary.

For

the perfectly informed observer, choices are unambiguously obvious, unique and
without surprises.

These differences in an observer's state of uncertainty are

expressed by the dual logarithm of the number N of possibilities available to
describe his world:

where zero uncertainty or maximum certainty is indicated by a situation in which
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all alternatives are absent, i.e. N=1, log
Third, being both abstract characterizations of processes, energy accounts for
the difference in thermodynamic states of matter (e.g. how much energy the process
of burning fuel into hot gas releases ) , while information accounts for the
difference in an observer's state of uncertainty before and after some observation
was made, including the changes a message introduces in the cognitive map of its
receiver:

I(message ) = U( before_its )
reception

after its
U( reception )

=
By simple algebra, this measure becomes:
I(message ) = -log (N
2 after/N before )
i.e. the negative dual logarithm of the logical probability
N after/N before·

Justifications for this measure have been given by Shannon

and Weaver (19�9 ) and many others (see Krippendorff, 1975 ) .

Accordingly, the

answer to a yes-or-no question, like "did he win the election?"

yields

log2 2-log2 1 = -log2(1/2 ) = 1 bit of information. With a 2-by-2 table
in hand, a researcher can distinguish two times two, or four, alternatives; and an
observation in these four categories contains 2 bits.

Generally, the finer an

observer's distinctions are, the more uncertain he will be in meeting a new
situation and the more information his observations can contain.

The complexity of

his cognitive system determine the amount of information he is able to receive from
his surroundings and to process.
Although I do not want to deviate further from the topic of this paper, I wish
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to mention that the processes which energy and information.respectively assess are

rooted in the material world and thus require energy to take place.

However,

fourth, the fact that the magnitudes of energy are unrelated to the quantities of
information involved justif'ies the treatment of information as an entirely separate
concern (Ashby, 1956).

I believe this to be the epistemological basis for

cybernetics, and communication research to be a discipline separate from physics
and the natural sciences generally.

The thermodynamic laws are not simply

translatable into the domain of communication.

The convention to call the

logarithmic measure of uncertainty "entropy" does not make the measure a homomorph
of the thermodynamic measure of entropy.

The analogies between energy and

information are valid only to a certain point, at which the two part company.

One

of the phenomena absent in physics but present in communication is paradox, to
which we can now return.
Common to all paradoxes is that they claim something impossible.
Contradictions of the kind
exclusive alternatives.

11

P and P" arise from the coexistence of mutually

And antinomies of the kind
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P implies P" merely add to the

contradictions a temporal dimension (as soon as one has chosen one alternative one
must conclude the other was correct, and as soon as one has chosen the other
alternative one is led to believe the former was intended.

Etc.).

Assuming that

all observations are possible (else the notion of an observed reality would make no
sense), the impossibilities that are apparent in paradoxes cannot but be a property
of the observer and stem from his difficulties in describing a phenomenon in the
terms available to him.
To ascertain how much information paradoxes convey, we must assess the
uncertainties involved.
unproblematic.

Before a paradox emerges the uncertainty is entirely

It may be large or small or even zero.

uncertainty after a paradox has been discovered.

What is crucial here is the

Within any conceptual space of

the world, impossible events have no place by definition.

After the observer's
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world turns out to be paradoxical, the number of alternatives available to describe
such a situation reduces to nil; regardless of the complexity of his cognitive
system.

Numerically:

Nafter=O, log20=-infinity, so tnat the amount of
information a paradox conveys is:
!(paradox)= U(

before its
receiption

)

- log2 0 = +infinity

On the surface, this result is astounding and may even lead a sceptic to reject
information theory as seriously misleading.

Originally, I was also puzzled for a

long time, asking myself how infinite amounts of information can arise within a
finite cognitive system of distinctions.

But a close examination reveals this

infinite quantity to be most meaningful.

Recalling that paradoxes result from an

observer's descriptive inabilities, this infinite quantity shows that such an
observer's cognitive space is simply not powerful enough to cope with the
complexities in his world.

If infinite quantities emerge he will be paralyzed as a

processor of information about this world and will remain so incapacitated unless
he "thinks twice," examines some of his own axioms and resolves the descriptive
problem giving rise to the paradox.
I am in fact proposing that quantities of information are informative on two
logical levels simultaneously:

infinite quantities indicate lack of power of an existing

system of distinctions with which an
observer acts on or faces his world.

finite quantities

measure the work required or expended
to distinguish (to a degree better than
chance)among a set of uncertain possibilities.

The former is of the either-or type whereas the latter is quantitative in the usual
sense.
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Without trying to reify the mathematical concept of i�formation with these
arguments, it does make a lot of sense to say that paradoxes are simply too
powerful to_be coped with by an observer and exceed the information processing
capacities of that observer.

Unless one is able to escape a paradoxical situation,

which is what Whitehead and Russel achieved with their theory of logical types,
paradoxes paralyze an observer and may lead either to a collapse of the
construction of his world or to a growth in complexity of his representation of
this world.

It is the latter which shouldbe characterized as morphogenesis.

Infinite quantities of information are indicative of such a knife-edge like
situation.

Resolutions of Paradoxes
Paradoxes appear in numerous guises.
familiar primarily to logicians.

Contradictions and antinomies are terms

Other empirical domains refer to analogous

phenomena with different vocabularies.

For example, the words "dissonance",

"incongruity", "imbalance" are used by cognitive psychologists to refer to
attitudes that create problems when a subject tries to fit them into his cognitive
system. Festinger (1957: 13) defines dissonance as arising from a situation in
which two cognitive elements are related, i.e. ooooour, but the obverse of one
follows from the other, i.e. are mutually exclusive.

His examples, of a person

being afraid while knowing that he is in the vicinity of only friends, or of a
person who buys another oar while already heavily in debt, largely concern
frustrated expectations.

These are intolerable when experienced and require some

resolution.q
In the social domain the terms "conflict" and
the two kinds of paradoxes.
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struggl�" are near synonyms of

Social conflicts characterize a situation in which two

parties claim possession or control of something both agree only one can have.
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Invariably, the key to conflict resolution lies in the description of the situation
either party maintains.

Struggle merely adds interaction to the conflict and

involves a temporal conception of behavior.

The temporal ordering of action and

response involves problems of punctuation which may lead to paradoxes in their own
right.

Clearly, conflict and struggle can exist only between systems that draw

distinctions, decide among descriptively possible alternatives and process
information.

(To the extent biological organisms behave deterministically as

ordinary mechanical devices including the solar system do, conflicts and struggles
do not exist except in a metaphorical sense to which I do not appeal here).
As apparent in cognitive dissonance and social conflict, paradox generally
paralyzes the information processing capabilities of the system in which it arises,
at least to some extent.

Note the example of the paradoxical command "disobey

Dzy'

orders," or the debilitating sign containing the words "please ignore this notice."
Note the example of the physicist who, by Heisenberg's uncertainty principle,
cannot have validity and precision at the same time.

Or consider this tale:

A crocodile snatched a baby from its mother and offered to return
it if the mother could correctly answer the question: "Will
I eat your baby?" The mother said "yes" and saved the baby.
Had the mother said "no" the crocodile would have had no problem eating the baby.
With the mother's 11yes", the crocidile could no longer eat the baby without thereby
proving the mother's answer to be correct and return the baby if the mother
answered correctly (Haghes and Brecht, 1979: 3). The mother's answer paralyzed the
crocodile.

The tension caused by less imaginary paradoxes, inconsistent testimony,

marital conflicts, revolutionary struggles,5 etc. are well documented and lead
one to conclude that paradox cannot be a stable state of any viable form of
organization.

If the paralysis caused by the emergence of paradox is not coped

with in some way, the organization experiencing it is unable to continue processing
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information and bound to disintegrate (which is one soluti?n to the paradox ).

If

such an organization introduces changes in its system of distinctions that
reconcile t�ose apparently irreconcilable alternatives which gave rise to the
paradox, then it regains its ability to process information and persists in its new
and more powerful form.

These changes constitute the resolution of the paradox.

It would follow that paradoxes characterize organizations (individuals,
logical systems as well as social institutions) in transition from one system of
drawing distinctions to another such system in the course of which the quantities
of information become finite and thus managable.
Just how this change is accomplished is largely a mystery.

The time seems not

yet ripe to solve this mystery, but there are by now sufficient numbers of examples
available that it might be useful to differentiate at least several types of
resolution of paradox.

In the following I will try to exemplify these types,

leading to a tentative distinction between five different worlds or world-views
which are labeled:
the
the
the
the
the

orthodox world
algebraic world
Euclidean world
cybernetic world
transcendental world

The last four might be considered paradoxical worlds, for they contrast sharply
with the orthodox.

In distinguishing these, I am claiming neither that these

correlate with personality types or ideological styles, nor that these worlds are
alternatives among which someone faced with a paradoxical situation can choose
freely.

Even so I cannot deny that preferences may be working here, and that some

paradoxes might be resolvable more likely in one world rather than in another, I
cannot yet claim to have found a predictive theory which would be the aim of such
efforts.
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Paradox .in .an orthodox World.
For the orthodox, the logic of this world is independent of the logic of its
description and must be discovered.

The orthodox observer believes he can make

statements of fact about this world in which the observer does not enter as a
datum.

Paradox, being inherently impossible, must then be the result of errors in

the observer's logic.6 The orthodox observer seeks to prevent such errors at

the cost of ignoring the paradoxical relationships between statements that might
threaten his system of descriptions.
Representing this view of the world most clearly, Whitehead and Russell's
solution to the problem posed by paradoxes is to avoid them.

To this end they

invented the theory of logical types which rules that the descriptive apparatus of
an observer be split into distinct logical levels or types, often two but possibly
a whole hierarchy.

In this theory, which is essentially concerned with reference,

propositions on any one level refer to classes of assertions on a level below it,
the lowest level being the level of immediate sensations or data.
separate criteria for the truths of its assertions.

Each level has

According to Whitehead and

Russell, paradoxes arise from the failure of an observer to differentiate among
these logical types.
proposition
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Thus, Epimenides' paradox is resolved by separating the

Epimenides is a Cretan" from the proposition "Cretans are lying" on

the ground that the latter refers to the class of propositions made by Cretans,
whereas the former refers to a member of this class.

The paradox disappears when

one insists that the truths of the two types of statements are independent of each
other.
Howe and von Foerster (1975) maintain that since 1910, this ingenious theory
has prevented logicians, and I would add by extrapolation, psychologists and social
scientists alike, from coming to grips with many phenomena of self-reference which

the theory rules out.

The theory has also lead social science methodology into

rejecting multi-level descriptions which according to the theory of logical types
are a potential source of paradox.

Quantitative methodology in the social sciences

especially has become orthodox to the point of being blind to the morphogenetic
consequences of paradox.
There are two features which prevent paradoxes from occuring in social science
data: The reliance on logically homogeneous spaces and the requirement of
enumerating units of observation in order to establish statistical significance.
Consider Osgood JU .w.,.•s (1964) semantic differential.

It is designed to

represent concepts in a multi-variate space, typically containing the three
dimensions: evaluation, potency and activity.

Each concept is rated on several

seven-point scales, which constitutes the dimensions of that space.
concept is represented by a point in that space.

Thus each

By this method, the semantic

differential provides neither a way of dif ferentiating between concepts of
dif ferent generality nor the possibility of dif ferentiating between concepts that
occur on different logical levels.

For example, if the concept "semantical

dif ferential" were included in the set of concepts so rated, it would end up at a
point in that space just as all other concepts in the set and m ight share this
point with a politician, a consumer product, a color, a judgement or a
psychological state, even so it refers to the semantical differential as whole and
is self-referential.

Osgood realizes this, of course, by claiming that the

semantic dif ferential has nothing to do with reference.

But the point to be made

here is that the semantic differential cannot be threatened by any paradox because
it regards all observations as on the same logical level.
The semantic dif ferential is only one example of the wide use of orthodox
methodology.

Consider interviewers in survey research who often receive comments

about the meaningfulness of the questions which subjects are asked to respond to.
These comments are about the nature of the questions and hence on a logical level
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above that of the questions to be answered.

From these comments the experienced

survey rese archer will obtain information about his instrument which is separate
from information in the data gathered.

But if he chooses to formalize such

information, for example, by terminating the interview with the question:

"Did you

like to be interviewed about the subject?", cross-tabulating and correlating these
answers puts them again on the same logical level, thereby excluding any notion of
cross-reference, self-reference and ultimately of paradox.
The same could be said about measurement models that follow established
conventions and carefully distinguish primary measurements or data from seconaary,
tertiary, etc., summarily called derived measurements.

Although this convention

recognizes different (logical) levels of abstraction, data are admitted on only one
such level.

For example, were Woelfel and Fink (1980) to receive from responaents

not only the attitude ratings required by their Galileo system for representing
attitudes but also statements on how these ratings change over time, on the
clusters they form in that multi-variate space, on the velocity of their movement
through space, etc.

(all of which are answers these researchers actually seek in

their research), such statements could not be entered as data into the system and
would have to be excluded by the sheer inability of the system of description.
The emergence of paradox is also prevented by the practice of counting units
of analysis which provides the basis of all statistical reasoning.
regards the objects of enumeration as independent entities.

Any counting

I remember the stress

encountered by a student who was interested in preference ordering and discovered
in the verbal responses he elicited from one subject an inconsistancy of the kind
A>B, B>C, and C>A.

His conceptual system could not cope with this circularity and

his whole research seemed invalid.

The orthodox solution to this paradox, and the

solution generally accepted for such data, is to regard each unit as having no
implication to any other unit and admit all ordered pairs as valid expressions of
preferences, thus making it impossible for paradoxes in the form of inconsistencies
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to enter the system of description.

(It is not impossible to test afterwards

whether a collection of these preferences contains loops, but this is on the level
of derived measurements, on which level the paradox is-in fact dissolved).
One would think that the family of theories of cognitive dissonance would have
overcome this orthodoxy.

But on close inspection this seems not to be the case.

These theories accept basically two kinds of information as data: attitude objects
which may be positive or negative in degrees, and expressed relationships between
pairs of attitude objects which may be associative or dissociative also in degrees.
All configurations of these data are descriptively possible, except that attitude
objects and relationships may have only one sign and one value each.

Cognitive

dissonance theories merely consider some such configurations to be unstable
(imbalanced, conflicting, or dissonant) and predict that individuals reject these
unstable configurations by altering the signs and values of the cognitive elements
until a stable (balanced, non-conflicting or consonant) configuration is obtained.
There are no new elements created.

The system of description is closed.

Stability

and instability are attributes of patterns in data, none resembles paradox or
self-reference.

(Curiously, the theory of cognitive dissonance seems to be more

powerful when the self enters the cognition in the form of justifications for one's
own actions [Bowerman, 1978].

But this has nothing to do with the formal structure

of theory).
One could go on citing one example after another, but it is already sa!'e to
conclude that most if not all quantitative techniques in social research have
responded to the emergence of paradoxes just as Whitehead and Russell did by
exorcising them, developing systems of description which are essentially flat,
logically speaking, and applying them to sets of independent units which cannot
contradict each other.

They have thus followed the orthodox method of ruling

paradox out of existence.
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Paradox

i.n fill Algebraic World

In for�al logic, the emergence of contradictions within a system of
propositions challenges the validity of the whole system and calls for an
examination of the basic premises or axioms on which that system is built.

In line

with this tradition, Whitehead and Russell's proposal was made as part of their
effort to rework the logical foundations of all mathematics.

But it is possible to

be less holistic, to identify a paradox when and where it emerges, to isolate it
from the remainder of the system and to thus sustain the whole system from the
threat to its validity.

I call this kind of resolution of paradoxes algebraic not

because many formal examples come from this domain, but primarily because the
resolution involves the creation of new symbols, including new operating rules for
manipulating paradoxes within an otherwise preserved system.

The resolution is

conservative in spirit and algebraic in form.
The simplest example of an algebraic solution to paradox comes from equation
theory.
negative.

In ordinary algebra one assumes that numbers are either positive, zero or
(Excepting the zero value, this assumption is analogous to the law of

excluded middle assuming propositions to be either true or false).
numerical equation as an example:

x

2

+ 1 = 0

To solve it, we might transpose it into:

x2 = -1

and divide both sides by x which yields:

Take a
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X : -1/X

Now setting x=+1, for example, yields the contradictio�:
+1 = +1/-1 = -1
and setting x=-1 yields the contradiction:
-1 = -1/-1 = +1
Clearly, this is paradoxical.
which is self-referential:

The reason may be seen in the expression x= -1/x

the root value of x that we seek must be put back into

the expression from which we seek it.
illegitimate.

In the orthodox world such expressions are

From an algebraic point of view, one might conclude that x must have

a value other than positive, zero or negative.

The emergence of such a paradoxical

value would threaten the whole system of algebra save for the invention of the
imaginary numbers involving:

which constitute a fourth class of numbers next to the positive, zero and negative
ones.

With the introduction of this new kind of number, the paradox is isolated,

properly labeled, and the remaining system of algebra can be kept unaltered.
Algebraic resolutions of paradox might appear to be mere patch work as they
attempt to fix the holes just where they become apparent, either without examining
the underlying cause or by postponing such a thorough examination to later.

The

pragmatic justification often is that there may not be enough time and insufficient
capacity available to enumerate and evaluate all underlying premises of the
descriptive system.

While all resolutions of paradox increase the complexity of a
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system of distinctions, algebraic resolutions discourage higher levels of
integration (in the sense of being based on fewer premises).

Naturally, since

society is not so formalized, we find this kind of resolution in much of social
reality.

One obvious example is the system of tax laws and regulations.

Paradoxes

m ight appear in the form of loop-holes which allow a taxpayer to be exempt from
certain taxes he actually owes according to the intended or ordinary interpretation
of these laws.

Large loop-holes can be a financial disaster for any government,

and a government can't afford not to make an effort to close those loop-holes, at
least from time to time, by enacting special legislation.

All legislation has the

potential of creating loop-holes, requiring further legislation to close them,
creating further and typically refined loop-holes, etc.

Current tax legislation

reflects this morphogenetic h istory.
Numerous examples are found in the way social deviance is coped with in
society.
not to do.

Take the "criminal" as an extreme case of someone who does what he ought
The label "criminal" serves to identify those individuals that

contradict the social-legal expectations of the remaining population of
"law-abiding" citizens and has an operational meaning invoking established
institutions to protect this remaining population from the spread of "criminal"
behavior.

All symbols of abnormality including "alcoholic," "mentally ill,"

"subversive" have operational meanings in society that protect the large system
from destruction on the one hand and provide institutional controls for the
deviance on the other.
A final example of algebraic resolutions of paradoxes in society is social
conflict.

Historically, Marx was probably the first social theorist who saw

conflict, specifically class struggle, as the major motor of social development.
concur with th is view except for the way such conflicts are resolved.

Marx

maintained that every system carries in it the seeds of its own destruction.
would say that such systems are incomplete and allow paradoxes to emerge).

(I
This

I
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seed grows into a class struggle (which has indeed the nat�re of a paradox)
pitching two mutually exclusive classes, each representing opposing modes of
production, against each other.

The emerging system eventually overcomes the old

system, thus leading to a succession of social systems, each more inclusive, more
just and more egalitarian than the preceeding one.

Based on this theory and data

on the frequency and magnitude of wars, Marx predicted a socialist revolution to
bring the capitalist system to fall.

This did not happen.

Instead, according to

Dahrendorf (1965), the then existing system responded to the emerging conflicts by
institutionalizing them.

Through the creation of suitable legislation,

organizational forms and technology, operational procedures were instituted which
made such conflicts as strikes, demonstrations, revolutionary activity
etc. integrated parts of the larger system.

Thus conflicts remained localized,

became regulated and are now no longer a threat to the new and more complex

system.7

Paradox .1n an Euclidean World
An Euclidean world consists of numerous dimensions that form hyperspaces
within which images are stored and can be looked at from several perspectives.
Paradoxes emerge when these perspectives differ despite the knowledge or assumption
of an underlying unity.

In this world paradoxes are resolved by adding new

dimensions to the conflicting perspectives until these conflicts are explained and
no longer pose a threat to the assumption of unity.
A simple example from projective geometry might provide a start.

Suppose we

are given three images of what we have reasons to believe to be a single unity:
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ODD
These images are so different that one might find oneself in grave doubt as to
whether they could have come from the same object.

The paradox lies in the

apparent impossibility of a reconciliation of these differences.

However, as it

turns out in this case, the images can indeed be rearranged so that they could be
the two-dimensional projections of a single three-dimensional object.

Given the three rather dif ferent two-dimensional images, the one three-dimensional
image may be said to explain these differences perfectly, it solves "the puzzle" or
resolves the initial paradox.
Adding one dimension to a space increases the ordinality or the power of that
space by one and yields images of a logical type higher than the original.

In an

Euclidean world paradox forces an observer to increase the power of his discrip tive
space until the paradox disappears.
Bateson exam ines several paradoxes of this kind (1980: 75-98); the one
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resembling the.foregoing example is binocular vision.

Two eyes that are aimed at

the same region of the surrounding universe will, because of their distance from
each other, receive two slightly different images.

Unable to decide between the

two and unable to reject information from the outside altogether, the brain
computes a third dimension which resolves the apparent difference.

This resolution

of the paradox caused by binocular view is for us so common that we rarely ever see
those differences in fact and always conceive physical reality as threedimensional.
Yet, because of our binocular vision we are also somehow stuck to this
three-dimensional version of the world and experience great difficulties when asked
to extend the power of the space to four or more dimensions. Bateson also shows
how the additional dimension of time lead to the discovery of the planet Pluto.
According to him, this was made possible by an instrument astronomers call "the
blinker" which represents change (a concept of a logical type higher than position)
on a two-dimensional screen. Bateson's examples do not stop with visual phenomena.
He found evidence of paradox -induced morphogenesis in neurophysiology and in
biology (sexual reproduction) all of which involve an observer.
By far the most important contribution by Bateson and his collaborators 8
is to link the emergence of paradoxes in human communication to certain mental
disorders. The social situation that has attracted the widest attention is called
"double-bind."

Here a message is paradoxical in the sense that it asserts

something, say about A, and at the same time denies the assertion about A.
Moreover, the relationship between the sender and receiver of the message is so
important to the receiver that he cannot avoid the paradox by running away from the
situation.

A psychiatrist demanding from his patient to "be independent" is one

example.

A mother who beats up her child while as suring the child of her love is

another.

Prevented from stepping out of the paralyzing circularity of the

situation, according to Watz lawick il .al.. (1967), the recipient of s uch paradoxical
communications is likely to look in vain for clues in his environment which would
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provide the paradox-resolving dimensions.

Unable to find such clues, unable to

decide which perceptions are correct, unable to sort out his relationships with
significant.others, he feels guilty; he is increasingly labeled as "bad", and he
may be forced to resolve the paradoxical situation for himsel f by assuming
different roles for separate worlds as he sees them.
category of schizophrenics.

This puts him into the

For the patient the double-bind is resolved by the

orthodox solution of having different criteria of truth for the two worlds. For
the psychiatrist the category of schizophrenia adds a dimension explaining a
patient's response to a paradoxical situation.
Geometrical solutions of paradox are also apparent in communication theories
postulating that each participant sees his own acts in the larger context of a
situation.

Underlying the work by Pearce (1976), Harris (1979) Pearce & Cronen

(1980), Cronen, Johnson & Lannemann (1982) and many others (with varying degree of
specificity) is a hierarchical organization of levels of meanings, e.g.:

contents

< speech acts< episodes< relationships< life scripts< cultural patterns, each
being a subspace and hence of lower ordinality than the space above, each
circumscribing a class of expected events for which the one above provides a
meaningful context.

In this theory, paradoxes arise when the interpretations of an

event on one level appears to contradict what is expected by the definition of its
immediate context and thus disconfirm the interpretation of the situation of which
it is a part.
situation.

Paradoxes are resolved by altering a higher order def inition of the

Althouh the theory says little about the morphogenetic aspects of such

solutions, and without reviewing the considerable details of this theory and its
propositions, it is clear that the constructions of reality that the theory
predicts to surive are those that are complex (in the sense of multidimensional)
enough to be consistent with how the communicator sees himsel f interacting with
others.
Many social concepts can be considered resolutions of paradoxes in an

Euclidean world.

For example, if one finds that someone a.l:ways lies, the

statements he provides are as informative as those of someone always telling the
truth, for �he receiver can simply recode them differentially.
arise only when a person sometimes lies and sometimes does not.

Contradictions will
The old dictum

that "one can't trust a liar even if he speaks the truth," leads to a rejection of
all of his statements, and is an orthodox resolution of these contradictions.

In

an Euclidean world, the added dimensions that might resolve such paradoxes is
"motivation," because the interest and the circumstances of the occasional liar are
likely to explain when he is lying and when he is not, thus expanding the space in
which lying is an issue.
In statistical pursuits, the addition of new variables is largely justified by
the need to increase precision, predictability or to control spuriousness.

Here

the notion of paradox rarely enters the argument for larger multi-variate spaces
because all the variables are on the same logical level and already there.
However, it is not uncommon that two separate studies yield conflicting results,
for example by relying on different variables in an effort to predict the same
phenomenon.

Unless such conflicts stem from faulty sampling and mistaken

interpretations, with which we are not concerned here, they are often resolved by
putting the predictor variables together and examining not how well each set
predicts the phenomenon but what the interaction among the variables of the two
sets contributes.

Interaction, being of a logical type higher than the variables

between which they are manifest, may then of fer a resolution of the paradox (of
conflicting results) in an Euclidean world.
Additional dimensions always provide additional distinctions within a
descriptive system and increase the amount of information therein represented or
processed over and above the original system or systems giving rise to the paradox.

25

Paradox .in a Cybernetic World
In a cybernetic world circular processes reign supreme.
of (negative) feedback, information processes are manifest.

Already in the notion
For example, the

simple thermostat at home is designed to make an elementary distinction between
what should be and what is and has long been recognized to have an uni-dimensional
image of the world (Boulding, 1965).
temperature, however.

The thermostat does not respond to the room

What triggers a corrective action is the difference between

these two temperatures (which is of a logical type higher than either temperature)
and it stops triggering such actions when that difference has disappeared.

The

difference between what should be and what is represents a rudimentary form of
paradox which is resolved at the equilibrium point where this difference is
eliminated and corrective actions need no longer be taken.
For cyberneticians the initial fascination with control generally and linear
negative feedback mechanisms specifically is long gone.

However, feedback (which

may not only be negative and deviation reducing but also positive and deviation
amplifying) shares its circularity with the antinomies of self-reference to which
cyberneticians now bring iterative solutions, thus emphasizng the dynamic
properties of their circularity.

In a cybernetic world one might say that

paradoxes, are resolved by describing the dynamic processes enacted by these
pardoxes, including the equilibrium properties or values toward which they
converge.
Spencer-Brown (1979) has been pioneering the resolution of paradoxes in a
cybernetic world.

He developed a logic of distinctions, a calculus of indication

(of marking the forms distinguished) and used time as the key to the resolution of
paradoxes of self-reference.

Varela (1975) subsequently developed a calculus of

self-reference from these ideas.
In fact, time could be said to be involved whenever antinomies are expressed
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in terms of a string of symbols that are read from left to right or in a circle.
Consider this story children tell in one form or another:
Once upon a time, deep in the forest, there lived a wise man. When a child
asked him to tell his most famous story he began as follows: "Once upon a
time, deep in the forest, there lived a wise man. When a child asked him to
tell his most famous story he began as follows: "Once upon a time, etc.
After a few repetitions the reader finds himself in a circle in which it no longer
matters where he started.

All antinomies are similar in this regard.

For example, to "understand" the liar's paradox one may jump into the
circularity at any point and experience the alternating interpretations:

he is

lying, he is telling the truth, he is lying, he is telling the truth, etc.

This

pattern of alternating states is the equilibrium property of the liar's paradox and
of an order higher than the alternating states by themselves.
resolves the paradox for the cybernetician.

Describing it

Spencer-Brown also showed that the

more complex self-referential expressions converge to stable patterns of behavior
of which the alternating states of the liar's paradox is an extremely simple and
perhaps even obvious example.

The point is that a description of such a pattern

resolves the paradox giving rise to it.

This lead Varela (1981) to the famous

statement:
Self-reference is the infinite in finite guise.
Spencer-Brown's and Varela's paradoxes are at least initially tied to
antinomies in logic.

I want to give a few examples of paradoxes in a cybernetic

world of different phenomena.

One is the very concept of human communication which

lies at the root of my most general concern.
concept is as follows.

The paradox giving rise to this

Confronted with a situation in which two individuals
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interact with each other, the observer of one individual is lead to explain that
individual's behavior by looking in part to the behavior of the other individual,
and explaining this other individual's behavior brings him right back to where he
started from, etc.

He finds himsel f in the paradoxical situation of a seemingly

endless circular process seeking explanations for the behavior of individuals
without beginning and without end.

The resolution of this paradox lies in an

adequate description of the very process of interaction, the alternating sequence
of actions which both communicators initiate and to which they respond. We all
know communication to be a form of explanation of a logical type higher than
individual behavior.

It is a concept whose dynamic manifestation is still rarely

understood by social scientists and, I dare say, by numerous communication
researchers who have managed to avoid the paradox giving rise to it, for example by
separating communicators, media and messages and describe the process
linear-causally.9
A particular case of the paradox giving rise to a communication concept is
punctuation.

Watzlawick il .w.,. (1967) give an example of a sequence of verbal

exchanges in which the husband withdraws and the wife nags and both feel miserable
in the end.

The husband sees himsel f as withdrawing in response to the wife's

nagging, while the wife sees hersel f as nagging in response to the husband
withdrawing.

The paradox lies in the conflicting interpretations of the cause of

the sequence, i.e. in a confusion of action and response.

The two interpretations

account for the individuals' motivation separately and probably prevent either
person from realizing the paradox that makes both feel bad.

Cybernetics would

resolve this punctuation paradox by describing the joint behavior as a sequence
without beginning or end, as a circular pattern maybe neither wants to perpetrate.
Another paradox in a cybernetic world occurs in attempting to predict election
results.

Politicians are well aware of the ef fects such predictions have on the

election.

They rely on this knowledge when showing confidence where there is no
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real basis for it or when making voters feel they are in the majority where they
may not be in fact.

Pollsters of voting preference face the dilemma of publishing

their findi�gs, thereby influencing the results which render the findings invalid
predictors, or of keeping their findings secret until after the election, at which
point they are useless for voters and politicians alike.

The paradox arises in the

difference between research findings and the election result which is influenced by
the publication of their findings.

Given the knowledge of how the public reacts to

election predictions, the most accurate prediction may not be the actual findings
but the equilibrium emerging in the interaction between knowledge of voting
preferences of the public and individual reactions (Simon, 1957).

This equilibrium

is the resolution of the prediction paradox and conforms to a prediction that is
stable and in this sense valid.
Finally, consider the paradox that arises when a scientific observer realizes
that the world he describes is partly his own construction and that he has a
significant influence over what he can know about this world, owing to his choice
of the descriptive apparatus and methods of analysis.

Following this recognition

of his own influence--! have already mentioned Heisenberg's uncertainty
principle--, he will have to step out of the initial observer's position and see
himself in a secondary observer's role, now observing a world that includes himself
in the original role.

This second world is quite different from the former.

Having come to this new role after recognizing his own influence over what he
describes, he cannot help being driven out of the secondary observer's role to a
tertiary observer's role, now observing how the secondary observer observes how the
original observer observes his world.
drives him to an infinite regress.

The awareness of the observer's influence

This can be paralyzing.

In an orthodox world

the paradox is ignored (psychology is separate from the psychology of psychologists
and from the psychology of the psychology of psychologists, etc.).
world it has to be resolved.

In a cybernetic

Glanville (1982) recently suggested resolving this
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paradox of infinity by finding the eigen-operation of "observation," which is that
operation which remains invariant over the various orders of observers observing
observers observing observers etc.
In summary, in a cybernetic world, paradoxes are resolved by using time to a
cybernetic separate the contradicting states involved.

The dynamic pattern thus

enacted is a logical type higher than the states giving rise to the paradox and are
evidence of morphogenesis of form.

Paradox

;i.,n

.a Transcendental World

"Transcendental" means going beyond immediate appearance and with this term
the Greeks described generalizations, leading up a hierarchy of understanding,
ultimately reaching the supreme being which is beyond comprehension.

In this

transcendental world, paradoxes appear in the form of polar opposites or mutually
exclusive concepts, and the resolution of such paradoxes is a generalization that
renders the two opposites as one unity.
What is common to red and green is color, and what is common to color and its
absence is visual sensation, etc.

I am not so sure whether all of these opposites

are real paradoxes and that the methods of overcoming the differences are clear
enough to say much about.

A Greek philosopher might be inclined to say that all of

the previously discussed non-orthodox worlds are transcendental, and he is probably
right by his own terms.

Nevertheless, there are resolutions of paradox that I

cannot place in the foregoing categories, and this is the place where I want to
mention them.
One early theorist describing the morphogenetic properties of paradox is
Hegel.

His basic contention is that all ideas about the world come with their

opposites (which is incorporated in the idea of information, involving a selection
among at least two alternatives): example and counter-example, hypothesis and its
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negation, or, as he calls this duality, "thesis" and 11 anti�hesis 11 •

These may clash

in the sense of competing for recognition, evidence or preference.

Unable to

decide between a thesis and its antithesis, the human mind brings about a synthesis
which transcends the initial opposites.
Marx turned this triology around and interpreted social history as a
succession of clashes between opposing social systems which are overcome by a new
system that synthesizes or resolves the old differences, the new being more
powerful, more inclusive, and more equalitarian than either of the old.

The idea

is appealing, but I see no procedure or criterion by which one could decide between
a victory for one side or, what the contention predicts, a victory for both.

I

already mentioned Euclidean resolutions to such conflicts which are not
transcendental as Marx would presumably claim they should be.
The criteria are clearer in the sciences where a considerable effort is spent
on uniting different theories of the same phenomena.

For example, the particle

theory of light and the wave theory of light are fundamentally different in
conception but largely concur in the predictions they generate.

To the extent

their predictions concur, they cannot be considered opposites of each other, do not
qualify as paradoxes proper, and the effort of uniting them has mere aesthetic
appeal.

To me paradoxes are evident when predictions are contradictory, which must

paraly ze the physicist who works in this empirical domain and is therefore unable
to settle on any one theory with confidence.

Only if the general theory resolves

these contradictions can that theory be called a synthesis.

In the sciences such a

synthesis can at least be tested.
The teaching of Buddhism heavily relies on paradoxes, called koans in Japan,
through which a student may achieve a state of enlightement and thus realize what
the Buddha-nature of the world is all about.

Examples of such koans are:
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"Show me your original face before you were born"
"Two hands clapping makes a sound.
sound of one hand clapping?"

What is the

If you meet someone in the street who has attained
the truth, you must pass him neither speaking nor
in silence. How would you meet him?"

To transcend such paradoxes requires supreme mental efforts, usually over years of
meditation.

Often the insights thereby "transmitted" from the teacher to the

student cannot be expressed in words, a fact that points to a notion of
communication alien to largely Western and perhaps orthodox theories of
communication.
Unable to say much more about the transcendental process of morphogenesis, I
prefer to quote Lao Tsu (6th century BC) as the most qualified writer to express
the paradoxical wisdom of the Eastern transcendental world:
Under heaven all can see beauty only because there is ugliness.
All can know good as good only because there is evil.
Therefore having and not having arise together.
Difficult and easy complement each other.
Long and short contrast each other;
High and low rest upon each other;
Voice and sound harmonize each other;
Front and back follow one another.
Therefore the sage goes about doing nothing, teaching no-talking.
The ten thousand things rise and fall without cease,
Creating, yet not possessing,
Working, yet not taking credit.
Work is done, then forgotten.
Therefore it lasts forever.
(Lao Tsu, 1972)
This wisdom surely is mind boggeling.
anything with it.

The orthodox may feel unable to do

The non-orthodox might be stimulated to rise above the common
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horizon.

Intuitively, this is a manifestation of morphogeQesis in a transcendental

world.

summary
In this paper, paradox is seen as a property of the interaction between an
observer (individual, institution or society) and the world he wishes to describe,
to act on, to respond to or to communicate with.

It presupposes that the observer

makes distinctions in this world and describes the alternatives resulting from
these distinctions.

Both processes are largely his own.

The quantities of

information this observer can processes are limited by his system of description of
this world.
A paradox is shown to be capable of paralyzing an observer, carries quantities
of information no system can handle and shows this observer's system of
descriptions to be not powerful enough to cope with his world in that observer's
terms.

Resolutions of paradox bring these quantities back into a manageable range.

Orthodox resolutions of paradox ignore the relations giving rise to them,
complicate the rules for admitting data as evidence, but do not increase the power
of the observer's descriptive system.

Many analytical practices in the social

sciences have followed this path, evolved systems of description that are logically
flat and immune to challenge by paradox, and remain thus morphostatic
representations of the world.
The four non-orthodox resolutions that are examined and exemplified present
different ways of coping with paradox and of making systems grow in power to
descriptively cope with a reality of increasing complexity.

It is my contention

that appropriate responses to the emergence of paradox are morphogenetic in the
sense that they force the human mind, systems of distinctions in the social
sciences or or�anizational forms in society to grow in power.

All of this may be
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motivated by keeping the quantities of information to be p�ocessed within finite
and hence manageable limits.
This p�per is but a beginning with all its uncertainties transparent.
it contains no flaws, but I do not fear when it seems paradoxical.
In formal logic contradiction is disasterous,
but not in real life.
It may be an invitation to new fascinations.
Discrepancy is the doorway to discovery.
(Siu, 1957)

I hope
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Footnotes
1. Starting with Bateson's {1955) theory of play, logical types and paradoxes have
entered the traditional communication liter.ature through Bowers & Sanders
{1974), Smith & Williamson {1977),. Wilmot {1979) but particularly through the
literature on family communication, e.g. Sluzki & Ransom {1976), Harris
(1980), Wilder-Mott {1980), Cronen � al. (1982).
2. See Watzlawick (1963, 1976), Watzlawick, fil .al,.
Olson {1972) for a good critique, and Ringuette
al. (1971), Kafka (1971), Jacob {1975), Berger
Grouns (1978), Harris (1980) and many others for
field of inquiry.

(1967, 1974) for elaborations,
& Kennedy (1966), Bugental .e.t
(1978), Doan (1978), Jacob &
further work in this thriving

3. In his later work, and with reference to communication within families, Bateson
himself is said to have thought that paradoxes may have pathological as well as
creative consequences {see Cronen � At,. (1982). The creative aspect of
paradox has been emphasized by Kafka {1971), and in logic by Chihara (1973).
4. For reviews of cognitive dissonance theories see Brehm & Cohen (1962), Abelson
(1968) and Zajonc (1968), for subsequent refinements see Festinger & Allen
(1962),and for further applications see Wicklund & Brehm (1976), Bowerman
(1978) and Carroll (1979). Chihara (1973:1) quotes Gottlob Frege's account of
his own feelings after receiving a letter from Bertrand Russel showing his
Grundgesetze to contain a paradox.
5. See Hiniker (1977) for an application of dissonance ideas on the revolutionary
struggle in China.
6.

See Chihara's (1973) account of Russell's solution to paradox and the
philosophical implications of contributions to paradox in logic by G8del, Quine
and Poincare'. Chihara's book provides probably the best guide to literature
on paradox in mathematics and logic.

7.

A recent contribution by Grathoff (1970) similarly considers social
inconsistencies as a motivation for structures to emerge.

8. For references see footnotes 1 and 2.
9. Much of the blame for the linear conception of communication is unjustifiably
laid to Shannon and Weaver (1949). But this conception is deeply ingrained in
Western philosophy, seeing man in the image of a creative god as a purposeful
controller of his passive environment, or here, a sender of messages destined
for others (Krippendorf f, in press). Moreover, with his distinctions between
different forms of communication research in terms of ''who says what in which
channel to whom and with what effect" Lasswell (1960) did not not only cut the
circle open as many classical communications theorists have done but he also
cut the chain into five separate pieces which is totally alien to a cybernetic
perspective and makes the recognition of paradoxes impossible.
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